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Abstract: I review the basis and limitations of plausible inference in cos-
mology, in particular the limitation that it can only provide fundamentally
true inferences when the hypotheses under consideration form a set that
is exhaustive. They never do; this recommends abandoning realism. De-
spite this, we can adopt a scientifically correct pragmatism and understand
aspects of the cosmological model with enormous confidence. I illustrate
these points with discussion of one certainty—expansion—and two current
controversies—the existence of large extra dimensions and the possibility that
the matter distribution forms a fractal on large scales. I argue that the exis-
tence of large extra dimensions is certainly plausible, but a fractal universe
is untenable.
1 Radicals, plausibility, and The Beagle
In my time in the nineteen-nineties working as a student of Roger Blandford,
he asked several things of me that have rung in my head. At that time the
matter density of the Universe could have been Ω = 0.1 or Ω = 1.0, the
Hubble Constant could have been 50 or 100 (in the usual units), hot dark
matter was as good as cold, the initial conditions could have been adiabatic
or isocurvature or worse, and only a fringe believed there might be cosmic
acceleration. Fluctuations were discovered in the cosmic microwave back-
ground, the ten-meter telescopes were coming on-line, the highest known
galaxy redshifts jumped from 0.4 to 3, and gamma-ray bursts became confi-
dently cosmological. Among other things, Blandford and I hoped to constrain
some of the fundamental properties of the Universe with Keck and Palomar
observations of hundreds of galaxies in the Hubble Deep Field and various
1A contribution to the meeting Exploring the High Energy Universe in honor of Roger
Blandford. Published on the arXiv only. Copyright 2009 David W. Hogg. You may copy
and distribute this document provided you make no changes to it whatsoever.
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other “selected areas”.2 Here are three things that Blandford asked me:
(1) “Where are the young radicals?” In this period, the notable objectors
to cosmological orthodoxy included Arp, Burbidge, Hoyle, and Segal, pro-
ponents of quasars as galaxy ejecta, steady-state models, periodic redshifts,
chronometric cosmology, and a range of other relatively untenable ideas.
Even among the main-stream, those over the age of 60 were much more
likely to fairly discuss a crazy idea about the Universe than anyone under
the age of 40. When the youth—those who are the engines of experimental
research, data analysis, and new projects—don’t care about outside chances,
the outside chances never get properly tested, ruled out, or investigated for
the seeds of new and more promising ideas. That’s not healthy.
(2) “Why don’t you gather up all the phenomenology, pack your carpet
bag, and sail around the Cape in The Beagle?” Phenomenology was pouring
in from telescopes across the spectrum and in such detail that absolutely no
theoretical model could be consistent with even a small fraction of it. This
continues today: No theoretical model of galaxies simultaneously explains
all the rich phenomenology in the scaling relations, mass functions, star-
formation rates, chemical abundances, morphologies, and clustering. Why
are we taking so much more data when we can’t even make good progress
on what we have? Stop gathering and publishing incremental snippets of
confusing phenomena (was the implication) and start trying to understand
how it all fits together; this will require a long period of concentration! When
you get back from the trip, write The Origin of Galaxies and begin a period
of maturity for observational cosmology.
(3) “Isn’t that just a plausibility argument?” Is the galaxy auto-
correlation function (for example) a power law because the underlying dark-
matter structure forms a power-law, or because auxilliary aspects of galaxy
formation conspire to make a non-power-law dark-matter auto-correlation
function into a power-law galaxy auto-correlation function? Here are two
explanations of the same phenomenon. How to decide between them, when
(at the time) there is (was) no means to distinguish them directly with an
observation?3 Any argument about this was purely in the realm of plau-
sibility; both sides agree on the phenomena, so the differences of scientific
conclusion are just differences in what seems plausible. Now, is everything in
2We failed, although I, for one, had a great time.
3This is just an example; of course now we know the answer from weak lensing studies
(for example, Sheldon et al. 2009).
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astronomy—where we can’t do controlled or repeated experiments, and have
(almost) exclusively electromagnetic channels for observation—a plausibility
argument? Can we know anything?
I will argue in what follows that these three questions are related. The
short answer to the last one is “yes”; observational science is a science of plau-
sibility, and plausibility arguments are an unavoidable part of doing business.
Nonetheless, as you know—and as I will try to complexify—we know many
things in cosmology with great certainty.
2 Bayesian science
There is an unfortunate set of battles going on in physics about statistics—
“frequentism” against “Bayesianism”—that are distorting the meanings of
both terms. Although if you read my recent papers you will know who I
support in this war, I do not want to discuss this question here. I want to
take back the word “Bayesian”; I want to use it to describe a way of reasoning
about propositions for which you do not have enough information to decide,
absolutely, whether each is true or false.
When you don’t know if a proposition H is true or false, you must assign
some degree of plausibility to the proposition. You probably want that degree
of plausibility to meet several desiderata, including that (1) degrees of plausi-
bility can be represented by real numbers, that (2) they obey common-sense
criteria, like that if the plausibility of A increases, the plausibility of not-A
decreases and that plausibility of the joint hypothesis A and B, for instance,
be related in sensible ways to the plausibilities of A and B, and that (3) they
obey consistency requirements, like that the plausibility depends only on the
evidence, and not the order in which that evidence is considered or other
irrelevancies. If you place requirements like these, you are led inexorably
and provably to Bayesian inference, with posterior probabilities taking the
place of the “degree of plausibility” you seek, and Bayes’s Theorem relating
those posterior probabilities to likelihoods and prior probabilities.4
Because these are good desiderata, and because (as a community at least)
we are relatively rational, the progress of astrophysics really does follow some
kind of approximation to Bayesian reasoning. We are Bayesians, even if
we don’t want to be; even those arguing that we shouldn’t be doing data
4This is demonstrated, among other places, in Jaynes (2003), an amusing and prob-
lematic text. Jaynes gives credit for the argument to Cox.
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analysis by Bayesian inference are, themselves, in their scientific reasoning,
Bayesian. We assign degrees of plausibility to hypotheses by considering our
prior knowledge (for example, the consistency of the hypothesis with other
data, other things we strongly believe to be true, and the simplicity of the
hypothesis for communication to others) and the success of the hypothesis
in explaining the observed data (this would be in the form of something like
the likelihood), and we combine the prior and the likelihood (approximately)
multiplicatively.
As an aside, if I am right, one consequence is that the Popperian view that
theories can only be falsified is (itself) false.5 In any contentious scientific is-
sue, there are competing, mutually exclusive hypotheses. No observation ever
completely rules out one hypothesis, because there are finite observational
uncertainties, because any hypothesis can always be complexified in relevant
ways, and because any observation can be excused from applicability.6 Any
observation that undermines (reduces the posterior probability of) any hy-
pothesis H1 also, in doing so, supports (increases the posterior probability
of) at least some mutually exclusive alternative H2, because the probabili-
ties of all the conceivable mutually exclusive hypotheses must sum to unity.
Thus, contrary to what we are taught in grade school, observations do just as
much “ruling in” as “ruling out”. This realization justifies our feeling—which
Popper would not have allowed—that the cosmic microwave background and
large-scale structure observations of this past decade strongly endorse or sup-
port the ΛCDM model with adiabatic initial conditions. We are right; they
do. On the other hand, see my comments on exhaustiveness, below, which
may undermine this argument.
As another aside, if I am right, another consequence is that we often find
ourselves working with models that are, in detail, a bad fit to the available
data. Strictly, if we were not Bayesians, but instead making decisions on the
basis of the absolute value of the likelihood (the probability of the data given
the model) or some equivalent, we would never continue working with models
that aren’t a pretty good fit to the data. And yet, we often perform inference
with models that are, technically, not a good fit. This is because inference is
not possible without a model, and so we must use the best models we have,
whatever their absolute likelihoods.
5I am exaggerating Popper’s much more subtle view here for emphasis; this should not
be taken as a statement about Popper himself.
6If you want examples of all of these, see the literature of the last decade comparing
detailed galaxy properties with the ΛCDM model.
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3 The impossible demands of realism
Bayesian reasoning is the calculus of plausible inference. What we would
all like—and I think what Blandford was getting at with his questions—is
an understanding of the fundamental processes that govern the Universe, an
understanding that is not just useful for calculation but an understanding
that is true in some deeper sense. Typically, a scientist sees the latter point
as either obvious and important, or else completely irrelevant. I would like
to argue that we don’t have a choice; there is some very clear sense in which
truth is not what is returned by any finite scientific investigation; all that is
returned is plausibilities (some of which become very very high), and those
plausibilities relate not directly to the truth of the hypotheses in question,
but rather to their use or value in describing the data.
The fundamental reason scientific investigations can’t obtain literal truth
is that no scientific investigator ever has an exhaustive (and mutually exclu-
sive) set of hypotheses. Plausibility calculations are calculations of measure
in some space, which for our purposes we can take to be the space formed by
the union of every possible set of scientific hypotheses, with their parameters
and adjustments set to every possible set of values. Bayes’s theorem tells
us how to adjust the relative probabilities of the hypotheses (and, in detail,
the relative probabilities of different parameter settings) in the set as each
new datum arrives. This procedure is provably correct, which is good, but it
only returns the correct hypothesis—the hypothesis that really does generate
the physical world we are observing—when the original set of hypotheses is
exhaustive. That is, we only get to be realists when we have considered every
possible hypothesis. Since the hypothesis space is almost certainly infinite in
all relevant senses, realism—the belief that confidently established scientific
results are (or can be) literally and fundamentally true statements about the
world—requires infinite computing and human resources.7 If you didn’t per-
form an infinite amount of computation, you did not find the truth (unless
you were unimaginably lucky).
This is not bad news; in fact this liberates us to take a pragmatic view,
perform finite inference with finite hypothesis spaces, and choose the best
models we have for further study. If we go all the way, we can even call the
very best models in this sense “true” and only be misleading to the most
7For example, Kolmogorov (1965), among others, proved some relevant things. Amus-
ingly, Jaynes (2003) contains many absurd pieces of advice in which these infinities are
treated as trivial.
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epistemologically rigorous. A good analogy comes from coding theory. By
far the best compression algorithms for transmitting data losslessly over a
channel involve building generative models of the data, where sender and
receiver have both agreed on prior information, or prior probabilities for the
settings of those models. As the message is encoded, the model is made
better and better, and the transmission of the messsage is, in some sense,
aspects of the posterior probability distribution for the parameters of the
model plus residuals. The receiver obtains the posterior parameters, predicts
the message, and uses the residuals to adjust it to a lossless copy. At no point
does the sender or the receiver ever have to ask whether their model of the
message is “true”. They only have to decide whether their model leads to a
substantial shortening of the message. In case you think all of this is crazy,
this is exactly how the Galileo spacecraft data were encoded and transmitted
following the failure of the high-gain antenna.8 The sender and receiver, in
this model, are not seeking the “truth”; they are both pragmatists. They
recognize that the exploration of a larger model space would lead to a shorter
message, but that exploring a larger model space might violate constraints
they have on time-to-encode, time-to-decode, buffer size, or computation.
Scientists should take as their role models not priests, who reveal truth, but
signal encoders, who improve everyone’s life on a daily basis by pragmatic
accomplishment.9
4 Expansion
It is important to note that pragmatism and plausibility are not obstacles
to extremely confident scientific conclusion. On the contrary, we know many
things about the Universe with great certainty. One example is that the
Universe is expanding; this has been established beyond any doubt, even
8McEliece & Swanson (1999).
9There is a perfect analogy between signal encoding and Bayesian inference and the
literatures of the two have converged. See, for example, MacKay (2003). That is, plausible
inference becomes exactly identical to signal encoding in an odd fantasy in which the goal
of a scientist is to losslessly communicate the observations with the shortest possible
message. If sender and receiver agree on prior information, that shortest message will
consist of the posterior probabilities of models and model parameters, plus residuals. For
all this to work, of course, the protocol for communicating the posterior probabilities must
be chosen to be one that is optimal for the mutually agreed-upon prior probabilities, where
I am using “optimal” here in the sense of Shannon (1948).
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when viewed in this pragmatic light. Consider the evidence:
Almost all galaxies are observed to have spectral shifts consistent with
redward Doppler Shifts, and more apparently distant galaxies tend to have
larger shifts. Now with calibrated supernovae, the distance–redshift rela-
tionship is measured with great precision and beautifully consistent with
expansion. All measures of intensity seem to vary with redshift consistent
with the Tolman relation, as expected if the Universe is governed by Lorentz
symmetry (so the shifts can be interpreted as Doppler Shifts). Along the
same lines, the Cosmic Microwave Background has not just the spectrum
but also the absolute intensity of a blackbody, as expected in an expanding
model. All observations of cosmologically distant objects are consistent with
the Universe being denser and hotter in the past. All reasonable cosmolog-
ical solutions to general relativity involve either expansion or contraction.10
Finally, the only successful physical models of structure formation at present
live in an expanding background that is consistent with the observed Doppler
Shifts.
The expansion model has an extremely high likelihood—it explains well
the data—and an extremely high prior probability—it is consistent with our
knowledge from other domains such as the theories of electromagnetism and
gravitation. Note that it has no, and has never had any, serious alternative.11
Oddly that doesn’t reduce our confidence.
Even if we do find a better explanation than expansion—and I seriously
doubt that we ever could—it won’t really replace expansion as an explana-
tion, it will complexify, adjust, or complement the expansion explanation.
See, for example, the replacement of Newtonian gravity with Einsteinian
gravity; Newtonian gravity is not seen by anyone as really wrong, it is just
a quantitative limit of the better, more complete theory. This point plays
into the realism point as well, but I have to admit I don’t know which way. I
think it shows that scientists are not realists at heart, even when they think
they are. But it is also related to the fact that inference does often return
good results even when models are simplistic; this could—in some sense—be
10This paragraph ought to be instrumented with thousands of citations, but a random
and unfair subsample might include Hubble & Humason (1931); Mather et al. (1994);
Songaila et al. (1994); Riess, Press, & Kirshner (1995); Pahre, Djorgovski, & de Carvalho
(1996); More, Bovy, & Hogg (2009).
11It is obligatory to mention “tired light” at this point, but only to note that it is not
a theory advocated by any scientist; it is only a straw man built to illustrate the strength
of the expansion hypothesis.
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the meaning of the word “approximation” or “limit”.
5 Fractals
ΛCDM is a ridiculously successful physical model of the Universe on very
large scales. It explains, simultaneously, the observations we have that are
relevant to the expansion history, the angular spectrum of perturbations in
the cosmic microwave background, the growth of structure on large scales,
and the abundances of large, collapsed objects.12 The large-scale structure
observations and predictions cover an enormous range in scale, cosmic time,
and growth factor. As with expansion, it is difficult to imagine another theory
truly replacing ΛCDM: The worst-case scenario for ΛCDM at this point is
that it will be seen forever as an exceptionally successful approximation to
the true theory; one that permits easy calculation of a multitude of accurately
observed phenomena.
There are many issues with ΛCDM at small scales, many of which I work
on, in the hope that we will be obliged to complexify the over-simple model
and open up new space for fundamental discoveries.13 But the successes on
large scales are such that any modifications to ΛCDMmust be made carefully
so as not to disturb the large-scale successes. In short, at this point we can
see the large-scale success of ΛCDM as establishing good certainty for the
model.
Perhaps the most trivial prediction of all for ΛCDM (and its physically
motivated competitors, such as the DGP model discussed below) is that the
Universe has a mean density—all physical cosmological theories are calcu-
lated on a background that is homogeneous on the largest scales. In a recent
set of papers, this fundamental prediction of the model has been tested; some
investigators argue that this prediction is not consistent with the observa-
tions.14 The Universe does not have to have a mean density, of course, but
if it doesn’t, then it is—in some sense—a fractal, or fundamentally inhomo-
geneous. My view is that homogeneity is well tested and qualitatively and
12Once again, the reference list could be long here, but an unfair sampling of the very
most recent results might include Tegmark et al. (2004), Eisenstein et al. (2005), and
Komatsu et al. (2009).
13I comment on this motivation in Hogg (2005).
14Sylos Labini et al. (2009a), Sylos Labini, Vasilyev, & Baryshev (2009b).
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quantitatively in agreement with ΛCDM.15 But let’s imagine, just for the
purposes of argument, that the observations did suggest, at some level, that
there is no mean density.
Fractals are beautiful and approximations to fractals (fractal-like func-
tions confined to a limited range of scales) are abundant in the natural world.
Certainly the massive galaxy–galaxy auto-correlation function is close to a
single unbroken power law over all scales on which we can measure it.16 So
it is tempting to think about inhomogeneous models.
Unfortunately—and importantly—there are no quantitative inhomoge-
neous models. There are no solutions to general relativity with an inhomo-
geneous matter distribution. Because of inevitable distortions to the metric
and expansion history, observables are impossible to compute (for example,
even the distance–redshift relation would become unusable), even if a back-
ground were known. The idea that the Universe is inhomogeneous makes no
quantitative predictions and explains nothing, so it is not a scientific con-
tender, even if the evidence against a mean density becomes quite strong.
Note the blow this strikes against pure realism.
A fractal model can only become a contender in one of two ways: Either
the evidence against a mean density must get so strong that it outweighs the
success of every other prediction made by the homogeneous ΛCDM model,
of which there are many. This condition is so far from being met, I can’t see
any way to meet it, even if we measure the redshift of every luminous galaxy
inside the horizon. Alternatively, someone can devise a method to compute
an inhomogeneous model and predict a number of observables and show that
the fractal model does as well as or better than ΛCDM. I don’t know enough
to know if this is possible, but I don’t think there are even any strategies for
executing this ambitious theoretical program; probably they would have to
be numerical. That said, I do not doubt that any success in this field would
have a big impact on the study of gravity even if it doesn’t turn out to be a
good fit to the data. Here is a subject with which someone ambitious could
profitably pack up and sail on The Beagle.
Back to reality: There isn’t at present good evidence against a mean
density; homogeneity is well established and in agreement with the ΛCDM
15We performed a straightforward test in Hogg et al. (2005), designed to be insenstive
to unknown issues with calibration and evolution. My view is that a combination of issues
with the data and with galaxy evolution create the results of Sylos Labini et al. (op. cit.);
the Hogg et al. test is more robust.
16The largest range of scales is shown in Masjedi et al. (2006).
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predictions. An inhomogeneous universe is so intractable that there is almost
no near-term future in which we are likely to be able to either observe or
compute anything interesting in this area. This is an apparent controversy,
but in fact great confidence is warranted. The potentially disturbing aspect
of the story I have told here is that the confidence comes in part from the
intractability itself! But of course a pragmatist is perfectly happy with that.
6 Large extra dimensions
Despite the great success17 of the standard ΛCDM model—or perhaps be-
cause of it—the world of fundamental cosmology is bristling with new ideas.
One of the most interesting new ideas is that 3+1-dimensional gravity is just
what we observe of some higher-dimensional model because we are (somehow)
confined to a lower-dimensional subspace. The most worked-out example of
this is the DGP model, which contains a simple idea but for which it has been
challenging to do precise calculations.18 Because the current cosmological so-
lution in DGP has a single parameter that determines the properties of the
background expansion, it has the same global freedom as the ΛCDM model;
that is, the two models have (more-or-less) the same number of parameters.
In a straightforward comparison between GDP and ΛCDM and a basket of
observations there is ∆χ2 ≡ 2∆ lnL ≈ 20, in favor of ΛCDM.19 On the
face of it, without evaluating the calculation of the likelihood ratio or any
controversy related thereto, this is very bad news for DGP. Is the existence
of large extra dimensions ruled out at high confidence?
There are considerations here that prevent any trivial answer to this ques-
tion. The first is that neither model is a good fit to the data. This means
either (1) that both models would lose a model comparison with some bet-
ter, third model, or (2) that both models must be complexified fundamentally
with additional physics, or (3) that the observational uncertainties have been
under-estimated. In the first case, it is irrelevant that ΛCDM is preferred to
17Actually, some of my colleagues would say that ΛCDM is a failure because it makes
use of a cosmological constant that it so far from either a particle-inspired value or zero
that it is extremely implausible a priori. That is somehow related to all of this.
18The DGP model was introduced by Dvali, Gabadadze, & Porrati (2000); a cosmolog-
ical (homogeneous) solution was found by Deffayet (2001); and growth of structure was
calculated by Hu & Sawicki (2007) and Scoccimarro (2009) among others.
19This likelihood ratio comes from Fang et al. (2008); a very different conclusion is
reached by Sollerman et al. (2009) with a more careful analysis but of a smaller data set.
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DGP, because ΛCDM is disfavored over all; that is, the test between ΛCDM
and DGP does not establish ΛCDM against its truer competitor. In the sec-
ond case, the addition of new physics will inevitably give both models more
freedom; it is not clear which model will more naturally obtain the freedom
necessary to obtain a substantially higher likelihood when compared with
the observations. The model comparison, at present, is between two models
that have had certain relevant physics “switched off” and the amount that
affects each model is likely to be different. In the third case, the investi-
gator is encouraged to think generally about what can be wrong with the
observational uncertainties: Are there likely to be some data points that are
rejectable outliers? Do all data points have underestimated uncertainties?
Which data points are qualitatively similar or similar in origin? Once these
questions are answered, the uncertainties in the observational uncertainties
must be modeled, with parameters fit simultaneously with the fundamental
cosmology parameters, and then marginalized out for the model comparison.
This procedure, if performed symmetrically for the two models (as it must
be, since it relates to the data alone) will inevitably reduce the magnitude
of the relative likelihood of the two models.
The second complexity relates to the issue that the DGP model as cur-
rently calculated is a very specific and highly non-linear theory, not all the
details of which are understood. The calculation of the growth of structure is
probably much more general than DGP, in the sense that it is a calculation
in an effective theory generated by DGP, that could in principle be generated
by many other fundamental theories. But it is also the case that the DGP
theory, in a different background or with different brane properties, might be
able to support other effective theories for the growth of structure. That is,
a test of the growth of structure in the DGP model as currently calculated is
not a direct test of the existence of large extra dimensions itself; it is a test
of an extra-dimensions-motivated alternative gravitational theory. There is a
lot of theory to be done to bring us closer to understanding what fundamen-
tal modifications to gravity (subject to Solar System and other constraints)
bring about what effective cosmological theories, and what the predictions
are for each of those effective cosmological theories. Unfortunately, given the
precision of contemporary data, only a small family of effective theories is
going to end up being consistent with the data; much of this time-consuming
theoretical work will lead to important but null results.
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7 The multi-armed bandit
These considerations play into the decision-making of what Blandford called
the “young fogeys”: Although putting a sustained effort into calculating and
testing alternative gravity theories could result in some beautiful physics,
until it looks like it has a good chance of raising the posterior probability of
some model above the orthodoxy, that career segment may languish uncited
and lacking in influence on the business. The “old turks” have more to spend
and less to lose.
There is a class of problems in decision-making known as “multi-armed
bandits” in which a gambler is presented with a machine with K levers,
analogous to a slot machine with one lever, where each of the K levers has
different and unknown probabilities for different payoffs.20 At each round,
the player must decide which lever to pull, where each pull may provide
some reward and will definitely provide some information. The details of
a player’s strategy can depend strongly on the player’s utility, or what the
player is trying to achieve. This will depend, in turn, on things like tolerance
for risk, cost of lever pulling, and discount rate for future cash flow.
This toy problem—as odd as it sounds—is an analogy for the performing
of scientific investigations, and indeed the problem was initially raised in
the context of adaptive experimental design. Every morning, an investigator
must decide what project to concentrate on—what “lever to pull”—whether
to work on incremental improvements to an orthodox model or develop or
test some radical model; the investigator must make this decision without
knowing precisely how much he or she will be paid (or charged) for the choice.
And, perhaps disturbingly (but related to issues of exhaustiveness above),
the number of levers that the investigator can pull is far, far larger than the
number of times he or she gets to pull one: There are far more good ideas (at
least in cosmology) than there is investigator-time to explore them.21 The
investigator’s utility is the key. In work on experimental design, the utility is
usually imagined to be purely related to information or knowledge about the
question at hand. But in real decision-making, the utility involves not just
questions of knowledge, but also of real-world costs and benefits. In these
20This problem was effectively introduced by Robbins (1952); there is now a long liter-
ature on strategies.
21And, of course, the levers change their payoff distributions as context changes, and
new levers become available as new scientific opportunities arise, so the pure multi-armed
bandit problem is actually far less general than the dilemmas of a scientist.
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matters, the utilities are very different for young and old scientists, where
younger scientists ought to have less tolerance for risk and a higher discount
rate for future payoffs (because they need to get their PhD or postdoc or
faculty job or tenure with a short time horizon), and older scientists ought to
have more tolerance and a lower discount rate. Hence the relative orthodoxy
of the youth.
Despite all this, at present there are in fact a substantial number of
the youth working on ideas as speculative as extra dimensions and fractals
and even more speculative. Some of my young colleagues are looking for
observational signatures of universe–universe collisions! It is possible that
our community has recovered somewhat from Blandford’s complaint. There
are many respects in which cosmology appears far more exciting now than it
did in the nineteen-nineties, despite the fact that the ΛCDM parameters have
all been constrained so well that cosmology is now referred to as a “mature
science”. I, for one, have learned that there is life even in middle age.
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